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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores three aspects of post–Cold War Japanese security policy 
development. First, what significant security policy changes have occurred between 1989 
and 2020? Second, what were the underlying factors that created the observed policy 
outcome? Third, how durable do those factors appear to be in 2020 and beyond? This 
thesis concludes with an assessment of Japan’s probable future security policy trajectory, 
based upon the answers to the three foregoing questions. 
 In seeking to answer the above questions, this thesis draws four primary 
conclusions. First, that Japan has maintained a consistent, but limited, security policy 
trajectory toward militarization over the observed period from 1989–2020. Second, that 
the observed trajectory is being driven by an interaction between external factors (China 
threat, North Korea threat, U.S. force presence, and U.S. diplomacy) and internal factors 
(antiwar norms, suspicion of revisionists, single-party dominance, and prime minister 
preferences). Third, that the factors driving Japan’s security policy trajectory toward 
militarization are currently durable in both vector and degree, while the factors resisting 
further militarization are situationally malleable. Fourth, and finally, that Japan is likely 
to remain on a long-term trajectory toward further militarization, in which Japanese 
technological and legal capability for use of force will continue to expand. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis intends to evaluate three related questions concerning contemporary 
Japan’s security policy development. First, over the past 31 years, how can the interaction 
between external and internal factors explain the security policy decisions that have 
expanded the international role of Japan’s military and the conditions under which use of 
force may be considered? Second, has the overall security policy trajectory from 1989 to 
2020 vectored toward remilitarization, or have the developments been only surface-level, 
leaving intact Japan’s antiwar status quo? Finally, how durable are the factors driving the 
current trajectory? The largest portion of this thesis, by volume, will focus on the first 
question by identifying and assessing the relative causal strength of external foreign factors 
vice domestic political factors upon Japan’s aforementioned security policy trajectory. 
However, the purpose of that exploration is to support the broader focus of this thesis, 
which is to develop an assessment of the vector and endurance of Japan’s contemporary 
security policy trajectory. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Japan is widely regarded by United States policymakers as an essential ally to the 
United States within the Indo-Pacific Area of Operations.1 This is overtly stated by the 
Commander of U.S. Forces Japan’s current mission statement: “The US–Japan Alliance is 
the cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and freedom in the Indo-Pacific region.”2 However, 
one need not rely on political rhetoric to confirm this, as from a military perspective alone 
the United States permanently stations more military power in Japan than anywhere else in 
the world outside of U.S. borders. 54,000 U.S. military uniformed personnel, including the 
US’ only forward deployed aircraft carrier, are present in Japan. As non-allied powers like 
 
1 Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, “About USFJ,” USFJ, accessed March 19, 2020, 
https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/. 
2 Commander, U.S. Forces Japan. 
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China grow in economic strength and military capacity, the capabilities of Japan’s military 
and the conditions under which Japan would consider use of force should be of great 
interest to policymakers and scholars alike. 
Despite having developed a military that is regarded in 2020 as being the fifth most 
powerful in the world, Japan is unique among all similarly ranked world powers for not 
having fired a shot in anger since the end of World War II.3 A sudden change to Japanese 
rules on use of force could therefore have an outsized destabilizing impact on regional 
security. By assessing the interactions between causal factors underlying Japan’s security 
policy development and defining its current trajectory, this thesis may determine a suite of 
policy-relevant assessments. First, it will help policymakers to set realistic expectations for 
further developments of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. Questions as to the conditions 
under which Japan is willing to use military force in support of United States’ assets are 
essential to answer whether the U.S. is to develop accurate policy for the region. Second, 
it will help to determine the conditions under which Japan is likely to consider the unilateral 
use of military force to defend its own interests. Third, Japan’s security policy trajectory 
has implications for those studying regional balance of power and issues pertaining to other 
states’ perceptions of Japan’s military status. If Japan eventually demonstrates a 
willingness and capability to use military force to resolve disputes, it could result in 
increased regional hostility towards Japan and decreased willingness for other regional 
powers to partner with Japan. On the other hand, a more force-assertive Japan would 
provide greater strength to the U.S.-Japan security block in attempts to deter Chinese 
expansionist behavior. 
This thesis will contribute to the current discourse by examining Japan’s security 
policy trajectory of the period, by examining the driving-factor relationships that could 
have plausibly driven it along such a trajectory, and finally by making an assessment of 
likely future trajectories based upon the durability of the factors that drove it to this point. 
The existing discourse is focused on two long-standing debates. The first asks whether 
 
3 Global Firepower, “2020 Japan Military Strength,” March 7, 2020, 
https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=japan. 
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Japan’s security policy can be broadly characterized as holding to the status quo of 
antimilitary norms or as militarization. This thesis will define status quo as meaning that 
Japan continues to embrace pacifist policy and rejects a trajectory towards the offensive 
use of force. This thesis will define militarization as a security policy trajectory that is 
moving towards a state of capability and willingness to use military force in order to 
achieve state foreign policy objectives beyond unilateral self-defense. The second asks 
whether Japan’s security policy is driven primarily by external factors, internal factors, or 
some kind of relationship between the two. Some theorists argue that Japan has undergone 
a remilitarization or security renaissance throughout the period under examination, while 
others maintain Japan has largely held to its antiwar norms and there is no indication of a 
substantive shift away from Japan’s traditional antiwar strategy. Japan remains 
outspokenly opposed to the use of force for anything other purpose than self-defense, but 
the status quo arguments do not satisfactorily explain how Japan has incrementally 
redefined its interpretation of self-defense. Nor do they explain Japan’s increasingly 
offensive-oriented military capabilities. Further exploration is warranted to understand 
how Japanese security policy has meaningfully developed while preserving a dedication to 
principles of self-defense.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The past two decades have produced a rich discourse on the subject of Japan’s 
security policy, with an especially keen focus on the capabilities and authorities of the 
JSDF. The discourse has been accompanied by a rapidly changing international security 
environment for Japan, which has brought commensurate changes to Japan’s security 
policy. As such, extant literature on the subject must be viewed as a product of the time it 
was written. Contributions that were made to the discourse shortly after the millennium, 
such as Green’s 2003 Reluctant Realism argument, offer insightful analysis of the 
underlying factors, but are hampered by a lack of awareness regarding issues that were 
4 
only just emerging at the time or had not yet occurred (for example, China’s resurgence 
and the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, respectively).4 
There are wide areas of consensus within the scholarly discourse surrounding 
Japan’s security policy development. However, the areas of debate are the focus of this 
thesis, and so the areas of consensus will receive only a cursory explanation here. It is 
widely acknowledged that significant security policy change has occurred over the past 
two decades. Development of new military technological capabilities, acquisition of new 
military platforms, greater participation in US-led coalitions, and the reinterpretation of 
Japan’s constitution Article 9 to allow for collective self-defense (CSD) are agreed upon 
by a diverse range of scholars, such as Smith, Midford, and Oros, as significant changes to 
the security policies that had remained relatively stable for the preceding half century.5   
Despite the wide consensus that security policy change has occurred, the causes 
and long-term implications of those changes remain a hotly debated area of the discourse. 
Oros is firmly of the opinion that Japan has undergone a “security renaissance,” while 
Takao and Lam argue that the security developments of the post–Cold War period do not 
demonstrate a break from previous security policy.6 Smith and Midford take the middle 
ground on this issue by arguing that the post–Cold War Japanese military buildup is 
noteworthy and a significant change from the previous status quo, but do not go so far as 
to say that such developments represent a fundamental change from previous security 
policy.7  
 
4 See Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 
5 See Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power, A Council on Foreign 
Relations Book (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2019); Paul Midford, “A Strategy 
for Overcoming Defensive Defense: How Can Japan Achieve Security,” Senshu Bōei Kokufuku No 
Senryaku: Nihon No Anzenhoshō o Dō Toraeru Ka. 18, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 112–15, https://doi.org/
10.1093/ssjj/jyu040; see Andrew Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the 
Twenty-First-Century, Contemporary Asia in the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). 
6 See Yasuo Takao, “Democratic Representation in Japanese Defense Spending: Does Public 
Sentiment Really Matter?,” Asian Social Science 7, no. 3 (February 28, 2011): p3, https://doi.org/10.5539/
ass.v7n3p3; see Peng Er Lam, Japan’s Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia : Seeking a More Active Political 
Role (Routledge, 2009), https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203877814. 
7 See Smith, Japan Rearmed, 2019. 
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1. Causal Factors of Japan’s Security Policy Change 
The scholarly debate emerges in assessing the causal factors and long-term 
implications of the security policy changes that have occurred. In the first area of debate, 
there is disagreement regarding the extent to which Japan’s security policy development is 
driven by external or internal factors. Some scholars, like Smith and Oros, argue that 
Japan’s security policy changes are primarily a reaction to emerging external threats from 
a remilitarized China and a nuclearized North Korea.8 Smith asserts that Japan’s 
contemporary security policy changes have been primarily driven by three broadly-
accepted external factors: Chinese naval development and territorial claims, North Korean 
ballistic missile development, and calls from U.S. leaders for Japan to directly participate 
with its military in international coalition missions. Oros takes a more nuanced position on 
the effects of U.S. presence in Japan. In part, he agrees with Smith that the U.S. has, 
especially in the past decade, encouraged Japanese military development. However, he 
raises the point that the U.S. presence in Japan has also exacerbated antimilitarist 
sentiments from the Japanese left and blunted the need for Japan to create its own self-
sufficient forces due to the continuous presence of U.S. armed forces within Japan.9 
Midford and Takao argue that Japan’s security policy is primarily driven by 
domestic pressures such as social norms, historical perceptions, and future national 
ambitions.10 Midford presents the most mainstream view of this camp:  that Japan’s 
antiwar norms continue to exert a limiting effect upon Japanese security policy 
development but have gradually eroded in the post–Cold War period. Takao takes a more 
radical approach, and outright disagrees with Smith, by arguing that Japanese security 
policy has been and continues to be primarily driven by underlying domestic social norms 
that reject militarization. As a result, he argues, military development has been significantly 
 
8 See Smith. 
9 See Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance, 2019. 
10 See Robert D Eldridge and Paul Midford, Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism, 
2008, https://search.ebscohost.com/
login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1172214; Yasuo Takao, “Democratic 
Representation in Japanese Defense Spending: Does Public Sentiment Really Matter?,” Asian Social 
Science 7, no. 3 (February 28, 2011): p3, https://doi.org/10.5539/ass.v7n3p3. 
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constrained. His primary assertions have been challenged by Japan’s security policy 
development over the past decade, as can be seen by the JSDF’s deployment of forces to 
participate in US-led coalition efforts, reinterpretation of Article 9 to allow for CSD and 
acquisition of offensive capabilities such a ship-launched F-35 fighters. All these decisions 
reflect a more powerful driving force opposite to pacifist social norms.  
Suzuki and Wallace adopt of position that finds common ground between those 
arguing in favor of external versus internal factor influence.11 They premise their argument 
on the basis that external factors like China, North Korea, and the United States exert 
considerable pressure on Japanese security policy, but this research has not seen a 
commensurate balancing effort on Japan to address the vulnerabilities. The answer, they 
argue, lies in Japan’s unique internal factor of a domestic distrust for Japanese revisionists. 
Security policy development is linked to the revisionists that have historically championed 
the cause, and so the domestic distrust is transferred to security policy development more 
generally. Suzuki and Wallace offer a compelling exploration of the predominant distaste 
for revisionist social platforms within Japan, and how that distaste colors Japanese 
domestic perception of revisionist-driven security reforms. Ultimately, they conclude that 
there is appetite in Japanese domestic politics for some level of security policy 
development and constitutional reform, but that inherent distrust for the underlying motives 
of the revisionists prevents more significant changes from occurring. 
A related question arises within the literature: to what degree are Japanese political 
leadership’s decisions a dependent outcome of internal and external factor influences that 
coalesce into political outcomes, and to what degree can the political decision-making 
outcomes be attributed to individual political actor objectives and biases? Despite the 
underlying antiwar norms within Japanese society, it cannot be ignored that the Japanese 
state government, by definition an internal entity, has been responsible for directing and 
ratifying the policy that has redefined the boundaries of action that Japan’s military is 
 
11 Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace, “Explaining Japan’s Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability,” 
International Affairs 94, no. 4 (2018): 726–27, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy033. 
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willing and capable of taking on. Much of that policy change has been made in the face of 
outspoken opposition from the Japanese public.  
Many analysts argue that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has had an outsized role in 
driving Japanese security policy development, and there is significant debate over the 
extent of his influence and the personal motivations behind his decisions. Hughes directly 
asserts that Abe’s nationalistic beliefs have come to dominate the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) and, by proxy, Japanese security policy as a whole.12 This dominance, he asserts, 
has broken down traditional Japanese government positions that favored non-committal 
security policy hedging to avoid being drawn into undesirable US-led security 
commitments. According to Hughes, Abe’s presence has driven Japanese security policy 
change in ways that cannot be explained by external factor influences alone. Oros disagrees 
by arguing that Japan’s security policy outcomes have little to do with the individuals in 
power, and instead argues that Japan’s post-2012 security policy trajectory would have 
been largely the same with or without Prime Minister Abe’s return to power.13  Glosserman 
acknowledges that Prime Minister Abe’s post-2012 security policies were believed to serve 
the national interest, but diverges from Oros by arguing that Abe’s conservative ideological 
goals have skewed his perception of what the national interest is.14 Therefore, he argues, 
Abe’s presence has had a measurable impact on Japanese security policy outcomes. This 
thesis will take a position adjacent to Hughes and Glosserman, arguing that Abe’s current 
dominance over the Japanese government has given him limited latitude to push the needle 
toward policy solutions that favor response to international pressures while remaining 
within the normative boundaries that domestic pressures will allow. 
 
12 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Strategic Trajectory and Collective Self-Defense: Essential 
Continuity or Radical Shift?,” The Journal of Japanese Studies 43, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 93–126, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/jjs.2017.0005. 
13 Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance, 2019, 104. 
14 Brad Glosserman, Peak Japan The End of Great Ambitions, Book Collections on Project MUSE. 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 181–82. 
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2. Trajectory and Implications of Japan’s Security Policy Change 
The second area of debate concerns the trajectory and implications of these 
incremental policy changes for long-term security policy shift. The literature on the 
assessed trajectory of Japan’s security policy can be divided into two schools of thought: 
“status quo” and “militarization.” Some, like Hughes and Oros, argue that Japan is taking 
meaningful steps towards remilitarization.15 Both authors hinge their assertions on the 
premise that the gradual erosion of domestic antiwar social norms has opened the door to 
public consideration of looser constraints over the use of force. Midford takes a middle 
approach by arguing that the Japanese public is still fundamentally antiwar but is moving 
away from anti-militarism and toward defensive realism. His argument is based upon 
extensive polling data that indicates this public opinion shift over time. Takao argues that 
Japan ultimately maintains the status quo as an anti-militarist state despite surface-level 
adjustments that have been made to modernize the JSDF. He bases his argument on the 
long-standing Japanese public opposition to increases in defense spending. 
The militarization camp, most notably inhabited by Hughes and Oros, argues that 
Japan has been on a trajectory of militarization over the past two decades and appears to 
be headed towards an end-state of willingness to use the JSDF for aggressive deterrence 
and conflict resolution. This position points to Japan’s development and acquisition of 
sophisticated military technologies, development of potentially offensive military 
capabilities, and the adoption of more assertive security policies as indicators of their 
position. 
The “status quo” camp holds that Japan has not meaningfully altered its dedication 
to pacifist security policy since the end of World War II. The arguments within this camp 
rely on Japanese public opinion, election results, constitutional frameworks, and ongoing 
peaceful policy as indicators that validate their position. Its major proponents include 
 
15 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Re-Emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power,” The Adelphi 
Papers 44, no. 368–369 (November 1, 2004): 139–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/05679320412331340377; 
Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance, 2019. 
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Midford, Eldridge, Takao, and Lam.16 Midford argues that the Japanese public has 
traditionally harbored deep-seated concerns over the civilian government’s ability to 
control the military. However, he acknowledges that Japanese policy and public opinion 
has gradually shifted toward a “defensive realist” belief in the necessity and efficacy of 
deterrence towards China and North Korea. The long-term policy implications of Takao’s 
previously discussed argument also rest squarely in the status quo camp. Lam argues that, 
on a policy level, Japan has not changed course from its Cold War strategy of influencing 
regional outcomes using peaceful means. He rejects the idea that Japan’s military capability 
development is reflective of a policy shift towards offensive military policy.  
The counterposed “militarization” camp argues that Japan has meaningfully altered 
both its military capabilities and its willingness to use those forces in pursuit of foreign 
policy objectives. Green, Hughes, and Oros make up the highest profile names in this camp 
(among primarily-English-language analysts). Hughes and Oros take the strongest stance, 
arguing that the underlying pacifist norms of Japan are eroding and Japan is moving 
towards becoming a country that is willing to use force to achieve its policy objectives. 
Oros refers to a “security renaissance” ongoing within Japan’s domestic political discourse. 
He agrees with Smith that the security renaissance is being driven by external threats to 
Japan’s security, but his narrative goes further. He argues that the external factors are 
driving a shift in underlying Japanese social norms towards accepting the use of force as a 
potential solution to international disagreements. Green offers a similar approach with a 
more reserved assessment. He argues that the Japanese state has been forced by external 
factors to adopt a “reluctant realism” policy, in which the use of force must be considered 
as an option, even if a domestically distasteful one due to underlying pacifist norms.17 
There are also significant contributors to the conversation that fall outside of the 
two larger camps. Smith approaches this topic tepidly. She focuses on the substantive 
security policy changes that have occurred since the end of World War II and draws 
connections between those changes and external threats that have driven the policy shift. 
 
16 See Lam, Japan’s Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia. 
17 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain 
Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 8. 
10 
She takes the firm position that Japan has rearmed and wants its adversaries to believe that 
it will use military force if pressed upon. However, Smith leaves open whether Japan will 
actually choose to fight when push comes to shove. Hiscock rejects the possibility of a 
complete militarization of the JSDF as politically untenable, and instead posits the 
existence of a “dynamic status quo.”18 He argues that existing pacifist social norms are 
strong enough to hold back security policy development from reaching complete 
militarization, but not strong enough to prevent incremental security policy changes that 
are deemed necessary to protect state interests. 
Outside of academic literature, Japan’s Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG) offer a narrative that appears to support the above arguments of 
“militarization” proponents. In its opening passages, it states that “Japan’s defense 
capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security,” which suggests an emphasis on, rather 
than begrudging acceptance of, the Japanese military’s role in providing for the security of 
the Japanese state.19 The public affirmation of the military’s preeminent security role is a 
departure from the Fiscal Year 2014 NDPG, which contained no such declarative language 
and focused on Japan’s more traditional roles as a non-combatant contributor to regional 
and global security.20 The language used in the Fiscal Year 2019 NDPG maintains Japan’s 
long-standing commitment to “exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a 
military power that poses threat to other countries,” but the added language is a noteworthy 
change from traditional post-war attitudes that the military was a dangerous tool to be 
minimized.21 Today, the JSDF serves a prominent role as the publicly acknowledged 
backstop of Japanese state security. 
 
18 See Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of 
Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Kyle W. Hiscock, “Japans Self Defense Forces 
After the Great East Japan Earthquake Toward a New Status Quo” (Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/6809. 
19 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines FY 2019, (Tokyo, Japan: Japan 
Ministry of Defense, 2018), 1, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html. 
20 See Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines FY 2013, (Tokyo, Japan: 
Japan Ministry of Defense, 2013), https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html 
21 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines FY 2019, (Tokyo, Japan: Japan 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The central hypothesis of this thesis is: From 1989–2020, Japan has been driven by 
external factors on a long-term, enduring trajectory towards remilitarization, and the scale 
of progress along that trajectory has been slowed, but not halted, by certain internal factors. 
There is an observable gap in scale between the growth of Japan’s security threats and its 
comparatively subdued balancing response. Internal factors are sufficient to explain that 
gap by modulating Japan’s perception of acceptable policy responses through powerful 
domestic antimilitarist norms and suspicion of revisionist political objectives. The 
mechanism of the above observed outcome is that external factors set the bounds of viable 
security policy decisions, and then internal factors modulate the security policy outcome 
within those established bounds. The multiple components of this hypothesis will be 
individually explored throughout the thesis. 
1. Causal Factors of Japanese Security Policy Development 
The first component to be explored is the interaction between internal and external 
factors that culminate in Japanese security policy outcomes. This thesis hypothesizes that 
external factors serve as the primary driver of Japan’s security policy outcome by exerting 
a strong influence that overrules internal factor influences. Internal factors such as 
resistance to the remilitarization trajectory, are only able to slow the progress towards 
militarization. 
External factors influence Japan’s security policy through both direct and indirect 
mechanisms. The direct mechanism occurs as a result of adversary state actions that present 
threats Japanese policymakers respond to in order to protect their state’s interests. These 
perceived threats originate from two places: PRC expansionist policies coupled with 
extensive military capability development, and DPRK development of nuclear weapons 
and corresponding missile delivery capabilities. The indirect mechanism occurs as external 
threats challenge the Japanese populace’s commitment to anti-militarist social norms. As 
external threats to the safety of the populace increase, it calls into question the sustainability 
12 
of the populace’s traditional anti-militarist norms and strengthens internal elements that 
favor development of a more assertive security policy. 
Internal factors have slowed the rate at which Japan’s security policy otherwise 
would have moved toward militarization due to external factors. Powerful antiwar norms 
were enshrined in Article 9 of the post-war Japanese constitution, and have persisted as a 
strong legal and cultural factor throughout the observed period.22 Miyashita points out that 
the strength of those antiwar norms has fluctuated over time, but that there is polling data 
to suggest that domestic popularity of antiwar norms has held steady over the long term, 
even as direct memories of World War II fade into the past.23 On the other hand, there are 
significant internal factors that have supported militarization of the period. The left-wing 
of Japan’s political spectrum, which traditionally supported antiwar policies, has weakened 
over time as the LDP continues to consolidate power. Finally, the LDP itself has become 
more hawkish over the period, which has generated security policy initiatives that are on a 
decidedly militarization trajectory.24 
2. Trajectory of Japanese Security Policy Development 
The second component of this hypothesis is that the relationship between external 
and internal factors has placed Japan’s security policy on a long-term trajectory to reduce 
its reliance on U.S. conventional forces to generate deterrent effects against conventional 
forms of PRC and DPRK aggression. The rate of progress towards that end state is limited 
by the internal factor influences discussed previously, but those factors are growing weaker 
over time in relation to external factor influences.  
Japan’s current security policy trajectory is on a course for remilitarization. As 
defined above, remilitarization refers to a rebuilding of capacity and willingness to use 
military force in order to achieve state foreign policy objectives. Japan has developed 
 
22 Akitoshi Miyashita, “Where Do Norms Come from? Foundations of Japan’s Postwar Pacifism,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7, no. 1 (2007): 99–120, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lci135. 
23 Miyashita, 108. 
24 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 128, https://doi.org/10.7591/
9780801459221. 
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offense-oriented amphibious assault and maritime strike capabilities alongside a shift in 
policy that expands the scenarios in which they could be used. The stated reason for the 
new capabilities is to fill a preexisting capability gap for defending Japan’s island territories 
and maintaining air defense of the Pacific Ocean.25 Furthermore, Japan’s outgoing and 
incoming Prime Ministers have stated an intent to pursue long-range preemptive strike 
missile capabilities to protect Japan from possible ballistic missile attacks.26 These military 
options were all but unthinkable at the start of the observed period, and indicate a clear 
trajectory of militarization. If the current trajectory continues, Japan’s definition of self-
defense, collective or otherwise, will likely continue to expand. This assessed future 
trajectory could be disrupted by a sudden change to the factors driving Japan’s security 
policy development, but their marked consistency over a thirty-one-year period gives 
reason to suggest the trajectory will hold. 
3. Endurance of Current Security Policy Trajectory 
The third component of this hypothesis is that Japan’s security policy trajectory 
towards remilitarization appears to be resilient and enduring. The broad trajectory of 
Japanese policy towards remilitarization has been relatively consistent throughout the 
1989–2020 period, despite a regime transition from LDP to Democratic Part of Japan (DPJ) 
and back again. The trend also predates Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s tenure and continued 
during the interim period between his first and second periods as Prime Minister. The basis 
for the trend relies on the continuation of external factor threat, which in the current 
political climate is exerted by China and North Korea. It appears likely those external 
pressures will increase over time, while the internal factor of domestic antimilitary norms 
will remain relatively stagnant. If these trends continue to hold, it can be reasonably 
hypothesized that Japan’s trajectory toward remilitarization is likely to endure, as well. 
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The 1989–2020 timeframe was chosen because it offers a thirty-one-year period of 
study that begins with a tectonic shift in the geopolitical world as the Cold War came to a 
close. The 1990s were an important period of development for Japan’s security role in the 
new world order, as it was publicly embarrassed for its unwillingness to participate in 
Operation Desert Storm in 1990.27 Japan subsequently explored the legal means at its 
disposal to bear international security costs abroad, which led to the establishment of 
Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations. The years 2001 to 2003 offer a 
picture of policy progression that began with the infamous Al-Qaeda 9/11 terrorist attacks 
and culminated in the unprecedented 2003 decision to send JSDF personnel to hostile 
foreign soil in the form of non-combat support troops. The subsequent 2004–2020 period 
will highlight Japanese security policy developments that emerged after the 2003 decision 
and provide the most-current-possible data for assessing the probable course of Japanese 
security policy development in the future. The twenty-year period under examination also 
covers the 2011 earthquake, which had a dramatic impact upon Japanese domestic opinion 
toward the JSDF, the unprecedented expansion of China’s maritime forces and territorial 
ambitions, and the realization of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 
This thesis will progress in three parts. First, this thesis will establish the course of 
Japan’s security policy trajectory over the observed period. The goal will be to highlight 
the fundamental chance in status regarding Japan’s capabilities and willingness to use its 
military abroad. This will be essential to have as a baseline premise for arguing the 
importance of the various factors that drove it. Next, this thesis will engage in a detailed 
analysis of the underlying factors that drove the observed policy trajectory. Especially 
important will be to understand the degree to which the factors changed over the period, 
both in ability to affect policy outcomes and the direction that they pushed policy 
development. Finally, this thesis will use the first two parts of the thesis to argue for a 
probable future security policy trajectory, based on an assessment of the current durability 
 
27 Sheila A. Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power, A Council on Foreign Relations 
Book (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2019), 70–73. 
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of various factors. Of course, a sudden disruption of factors, or the introduction of a new 
one, introduces the possibility of a change to the future trajectory. Nevertheless, it remains 
a useful exercise because future academics could assess how such a new factor will interact 
with the existing structure, and thereby understand the newly established trajectory. 
To test the causal factors component of the hypothesis, this thesis will examine 
highlight moments of Japanese state decision-making behavior in scenarios that pitted the 
internal and external factors in opposition to one another. If it can be shown that either side 
exercises an outsized impact on decision-making, then it can be determined that one is the 
primary and the other is the secondary driver of Japanese security policy. Based on existing 
scholarship, it appears most likely that both factors exert considerable influence upon 
Japanese leadership’s decision-making, but the stronger factor has more power to influence 
Japan’s security policy trajectory over the long period. Possible case studies include 
flashpoints within the ongoing Senkaku Islands dispute, Liancourt Rocks dispute, Japanese 
participation in the Iraq War, U.S. basing within Japan, North Korean abductions of 
Japanese citizens, and capability development of the JSDF. To use the Senkaku Islands 
dispute as an example, the following aspects would be considered: Do Chinese military 
territorial water incursions trigger short-term responses from the Japanese military, such as 
increased aircraft patrols over the island, increased naval/coast guard vessels on station, or 
even an in-kind territorial water incursion of their own? Do longer term changes to Chinese 
policy regarding the Senkaku Islands trigger longer term security policy responses from 
the Japanese government to counter the Chinese actions? 
To test the endurance component of the hypothesis, a qualitative assessment will 
be made of the past and current durability of the various sub-factors that support each of 
the identified primary factors. If the primary factors, and their sub-factors, have been stable 
over the period and present conditions are suitable for their future stability, then a case will 
be made for the usefulness of assessing a probable future security policy trajectory that is 
driven by those factors. The most significant external factors to be examined are China/
North Korea threat and the US/Japan alliance. The most significant internal factors to be 
examined are Japanese antimilitary social norms and suspicion of revisionists. 
16 
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II. OBSERVED SECURITY POLICY TRAJECTORY 
This chapter will characterize the broad trajectory of Japanese security policy 
development during the observed period of 1989 to 2020. By measure of global reach, 
international behavior, and force versatility, Japanese security policy has undergone 
significant development during the observed period. Since 1989, Japanese land forces have 
been operationally deployed abroad, albeit always in a non-violent capacity; new military 
capability acquisitions have significantly increased Japan’s capacity to unilaterally address 
security threats, including some capabilities to project force throughout the Asia region; 
and a high-level reinterpretation of Japanese constitution Article 9 has provided Japanese 
policymakers and military leaders alike with greater strategic and tactical options for 
military force employment. However, three significant restraints upon Japan’s force 
projection capability have not budged. Japan’s defense budget has not increased beyond its 
unofficial baseline of 1% GDP, Japan has not passed a formal revision to the state 
constitution that continues to restrict the activities of Japan’s Self Defense Forces, and anti-
militarist social norms continue to restrain security policy development.28 Despite those 
continuing restraints, Japanese security policy has maintained a credible trajectory towards 
increased military capacity over the observed period. 
A. 1989–2000 
In 1989, the collapse of the Berlin Wall set in motion a geopolitical sea change that 
set the stage for Japan’s remilitarization trajectory. The subsequent dissolution of the 
Soviet Union that culminated in December 1991 prompted discussion of Japan’s new role 
in the world. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, Japan’s only credible external threat was 
the Soviet Union itself, against which Japan enjoyed both the protection of the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella and confidence in the US’ overwhelming focus on deterring Soviet aggression. 
Japan had, up to that point, settled into its defense role as a Western-Pacific partner to the 
U.S. in support of that effort. After the fall, however, Japan’s threat landscape began to 
 
28 World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Japan | Data,” The World Bank Group, accessed 
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shift. Japan became less important as a strategic bulwark for the U.S. and therefore its role 
in the international order became less defined. At the same time, North Korea began to 
assert its threat capability with the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
capable of reaching Japan, and China’s military and economic growth surged in in close 
proportion to the fading of Japan’s hopes for Chinese liberalization. 
In 1990, Japan came under international political pressure to support the US-led 
war effort against Iraq in the Gulf War. It was made clear that Japan’s desired role of 
lending financial support while withholding its own military forces from becoming 
physically involved was not viewed by the U.S. as an adequate method of contribution.29 
Despite the fact that Japan pledged and eventually delivered $13 billion dollars in support 
to the US-led effort, Japan faced widespread international backlash for a perceived lack of 
willingness to engage in burden sharing commensurate with its capability and 
responsibility. An important point to note is that Japan’s first attempt to assuage these 
international concerns was to dispatch Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) aircraft for 
the transport of war refugees to Cairo. Significantly, this initiative failed because of 
outspoken resistance both from the opposition parties within the government and a majority 
of the Japanese populace. In fact, an Asahi Shimbun survey found that 55% of respondents 
were actively opposed to the deployment of the JASDF, even for a purely non-violent 
transport mission.30 
In April of 1991, in response to continuing international pressure and 
embarrassment for its inability to offer a physical contribution to the Gulf War effort, the 
Japanese government announced that it would send Japan Maritime Self Defense Force 
(JMSDF) minesweeper ships to the Persian Gulf as part of the JSDF’s first operational 
overseas deployment since its founding.31 The legal and political justification was made 
that the mine-clearing operation was necessary for ensuring the security and prosperity of 
Japan, as it relied heavily upon oil transported through the Persian Gulf. Purrington argues 
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that, in fact, the operation was largely a symbolic gesture intended to stem the tide of 
international bad will towards Japan, as well as to establish a precedent for the JSDF to be 
sent overseas under specific conditions. Six minesweeper ships were sent, successfully 
conducted minesweeping operations, and returned without incident. However, Japan’s 
international reputation would continue to be haunted by the accusation that tit had 
provided too little, too late.32In June of 1992, Japan’s governing Diet approved the 
contentious International Peace Cooperation Bill to enable Japanese troop participation in 
UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) abroad. The bill established five principles that must 
be satisfied for Japanese participation in a PKO:  
1) Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to 
the armed conflict. 
2) Consent for the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations as well as 
Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the 
host country as well as from the parties to the armed conflict. 
3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, and not favor any of 
the parties to the armed conflict. 
4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease 
to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend 
International Peace Cooperation Assignments. Unless the requirements are 
satisfied again quickly, the Government of Japan may terminate the 
dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation 
Assignments. 
5) The use of weapons shall be within the limits judged reasonably 
necessary according to the circumstances.33  
The text of the bill makes it apparent that explicit care was paid to the principles of 
consent, consensus, and peacefulness that Japanese troops were required to abide by in 
efforts abroad. Nevertheless, a policy door had been opened to scenarios where Japanese 
troops were deployed and operating within another sovereign state’s borders. Just three 
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months later, Japan dispatched a contingent of Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) 
troops abroad to Cambodia in support of a UN-sanctioned PKO to monitor democratic 
elections and assist with reconstruction of the state following the Cambodian-Vietnamese 
War and departure of Vietnamese forces. Japan continued its policy of participation in 
PKOs and Humanitarian Relief Operations by subsequently dispatching troops to 
Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Rwanda, and East Timor. In all of these cases the 
dispatched Japanese forces operated under UN mandate and operational control.34 
B. 2001–2009 
In 2001, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., Japan once again came 
under political pressure from the U.S. to assume a more tangible role in international 
security efforts. This time, Japan was pressured to support the emerging War on Terror.35 
Japan initially responded by approving the Special Measures Law for Preventing Terrorism 
at Sea in November of 2001, opening the door for the JMSDF to participate in Indian Ocean 
refueling operations in support of coalition vessels. Japan maintained that effort until 2010, 
involving a total of fourteen JMSDF ships and 2,400 personnel throughout the period.36 
This role was relatively low-risk, and decidedly non-combat, but demonstrated an intent 
and capability (albeit limited) to support international efforts abroad. More importantly, 
despite the peaceful nature of the mission, the refueling efforts demonstrated Japan’s 
capacity for conducting sustained, long-range logistics operations to areas far beyond the 
waters surrounding Japan. The operational success of the operation marked a milestone of 
developing post-war Japanese military capacity that could be employed in future force 
projection endeavors. However, the refueling mission came to an end in January of 2010. 
The decision resulted from a domestic power transition from the LDP to DPJ leadership 
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who had made a campaign pledge to end the mission due to the increasing Japanese 
domestic unpopularity of the US-led effort in Afghanistan.37 
In 2003, the Japanese government decided to take on a larger role in the burden 
sharing of global security efforts by deploying JGSDF ground troops to support the 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The decision was enabled by the passing of new legislation, 
the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance 
in Iraq, which permitted, for the first time, the dispatch of JGSDF troops to foreign territory 
not associated with an active UN PKO. The significance of JGSDF participation in Iraq 
comes from the unprecedented scale, duration, and expansion of Japanese Rules of 
Engagement for its troops. However, Japan’s internal norms and laws limited the Japanese 
forces to non-combat roles. As a result of strong, continued commitment by the Japanese 
public to constitution Article 9, Japan’s forces remained prohibited from engaging in 
combat under any circumstances except the absolute minimum necessary for self-defense. 
That definition of self-defense expanded from the strictest definition of single members of 
a unit, to the unit as a whole, to finally include defense of coalition forces that were working 
directly alongside the JGSDF unit.38 The tight restrictions drew criticism domestically and 
abroad, as many questioned the utility of a Japanese military presence when the burden of 
their own force protection largely fell upon other nations’ forces. Internal critics also 
bemoaned that Japanese ground commanders were placed in a dangerous position due the 
extreme restrictions upon their capability to defend their units. However, despite the 
JGSDF restraints on self-defense capacity, from 2003 to 2006 a total of 5,500 JGSDF 
troops served alongside coalition forces in Iraq without a single loss of life.39  
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In 2002, the Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) committed funds to acquire the US-
developed Aegis ballistic missile defense system for use onboard JMSDF destroyers.40 
Publicly, the Japanese government’s rationale for acquisition of the defense system was 
solely focused upon the rising ballistic missile threat from North Korea.41 North Korea had 
just made headlines by announcing a resumption of its nuclear weapons development 
program, and had maintained a capability to strike the Japanese mainland with 
conventional ballistic missiles since 1990.42 However, Hughes points out that the defense 
capability applied equally well to ballistic missile threats from China which, despite being 
more politically sensitive to confront directly, were seen as posing a long-term rising threat 
to Japanese security. The capability acquisition was not a radical departure from previously 
established JMSDF defense roles as the shield in relation to the U.S. sword. However, it 
added another layer to the JMSDF’s role in strategic deterrence and strengthened Japan’s 
unilateral capability to protect its territory from attack. 
In 2008, the Japanese government further expanded its global maritime ambitions 
by calling for the UN to create a Combined Maritime Force (CMF) to combat and deter 
maritime pirates off the coast of Somalia.43 Japan’s move was a response to an alarming 
growth in piracy of shipping traffic upon which the Japanese economy depended. For the 
first time, Japan proactively sought new international roles for its maritime forces. Smith 
discusses the progression of this mission as two JMSDF Destroyers were dispatched along 
with Japan Coast Guard patrol ships to participate in the CMF and thereby deter piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden. Japan’s ambitions in this area grew when Japan began stationing P-3 
maritime surveillance aircraft in Djibouti in 2009 and established a permanent base for 
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Japanese forces in Djibouti in 2011. Throughout that period and continuously since then, 
Japan has maintained a rotation of JMSDF destroyers and P-3 surveillance aircraft to 
Djibouti. Outside of the law-enforcement benefits, these operations have tested and 
affirmed a new precedent for Japanese maritime forces to operate abroad long-term. 
C. 2010–2020 
In 2010, the Japan-China dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands entered a newly 
confrontational period that remains active at the time of this writing in 2020. On September 
7, 2010, Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) vessels sighted a Chinese fishing trawler, Minjinyu, 
within the disputed territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.44  After 
ignoring demands from JCG vessels to depart the area, the Minjinyu collided with one of 
the JCG vessels and then attempted to flee. The captain was caught and arrested by the 
JCG and then taken back to Japan for questioning. The fourteen Chinese crewmembers 
onboard the vessel were detained as witnesses to the suspected crime. The incident sparked 
widespread anti-Japanese outrage in China as a result of accusations that Japan’s actions 
violated several agreements, chief among which was the 1975 Sino-Japanese Fisheries 
Agreement that stated prosecution of legal infractions was only to be handled by the flag 
state of the accused. Japan responded that a serious crime like ramming did not fall under 
the jurisdiction of Fisheries agreement, and that the agreement itself allowed for the 
temporary detaining of evidence and witnesses “necessary or appropriate” to determine the 
facts of an incident.  
In response, Beijing took several unprecedented foreign policy steps, most notably 
a demand “for the immediate release of the captain,” the “suspension of a bilateral dialogue 
on joint oil and gas development in the East China Sea,” halted shipments of rare-earth 
metals, arrested four Japanese nationals on suspicion of spying, and sent a Chinese 
Maritime Law Enforcement ship to the Senkaku Islands.45 The immediate issue was 
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resolved when the Japanese Prime Minister met with U.S. President Obama and, Green 
believes, made the decision to release the Chinese captain in exchange for explicit 
assurances from the U.S. that the Senkaku Islands were covered under the protection of the 
U.S.-Japan bilateral security treaty.46 
In September 2012, Japan demonstrated an increased willingness to assert its 
contested claim to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Japan purchased the islands from 
a Japanese private citizen who claimed to own the three largest islands within the eight-
island cluster. The Chinese response was to begin routinely sending Chinese Coast Guard 
vessels on territorial water (TTW) incursions into the waters surrounding the Senkaku 
Islands as a challenge to the Japanese sovereignty claim over the feature. Prior to the 
Japanese government purchase of the islands, maritime incursions into the Senkaku Islands 
were relatively rare and airborne incursions were unheard of. Sometimes, entire years 
would pass without incident.47  Following the purchase, however, Chinese TTW incursions 
peaked at a rate of seventeen per month in the late 2012–2013 period and then settled down 
to an average rate of ten incursions per month from 2014–2020.48 In 2012, China also 
began the practice of sending State Oceanic Administration surveillance aircraft through 
the islands’ airspace, which triggers fighter scrambles from Japan and contributed to the 
relocation of an F-15 squadron from mainland Japan to Naha, Okinawa.49  
China has so far stopped short of sending military vessels within the contested 
territorial waters, but it remains a concern of the Japanese public that China could 
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eventually attempt to seize the islands by force.50 Smith discusses that Japan responded to 
the increased Chinese activity by increasing its own presence around the islands.51 The 
increased military activity culminated in a new status quo in which both China and Japan 
routinely patrol the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands using surveillance aircraft and 
Coast Guard vessels, triggering fighter scrambles and the routine presence of naval 
combatant ships just over the horizon.52 
In March 2011, a 9.0 earthquake, the largest on record, struck off the Northeastern 
coast of Japan. The shaking triggered a fifty-foot high tsunami that, combined with the 
effects of the earthquake, killed 19,000 people. The subsequent reactor explosions at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant resulted in a precipitous drop of public confidence 
in the Japanese government, generally, and Tokyo Electric Power Company, specifically. 
The public responded to the JSDF with an inverse upswell of confidence and goodwill for 
its efforts in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief across the affected areas.53 
Therefore, while the earthquake and subsequent JSDF’s disaster relief efforts were not 
directly tied to immediate security policy change, the event is significant in this timeline 
for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the JSDF’s capacity to lead a sustained, large-scale 
operation in which it played the leading role among international partners. Second, it led 
to a lasting upswell of Japanese public support for the JSDF that has significant 
implications for the domestic factors of Japanese security policy development. 
In 2014, the Japanese Diet announced an official reinterpretation of Japanese 
Constitution Article 9.54 This was a step short of an actual revision of the text, but the 
reinterpretation of the existing text allowed for the policy creation of a concept known as 
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collective self-defense. The change in policy from unilateral to collective self-defense 
allows for a widening of the scenarios in which JSDF units can engage in combat to defend 
allies. Prior to this change, JMSDF ships that were sailing alongside U.S. navy ships would 
not be allowed to return fire if the U.S. ship came under attack by an adversary. Now, the 
policy is in place so that JMSDF ships can respond with force to attacks on allied units 
which are acting in defense of Japan. This change enabled the possibility of JMSDF ships 
to sail with U.S. ships in an operational, combat-ready capacity for the first time. The fruits 
of this policy shift were first observed in 2017 when JMSDF ships sailed in real-world 
operations alongside U.S. Navy ships.55 Strategically speaking, this policy shift improves 
Japan’s and the US’s combined deterrence capacity as the members are better able to 
allocate resources to support one another’s operations. 
In 2018, Japan made two capability acquisition decisions that will dramatically 
expand Japan’s technical capability to exert force and represented a clear breakaway from 
the strategic limitations of the past. First, Japan established the Amphibious Rapid 
Deployment Brigade (ARDB).56 This is effectively a small marine corps of fewer than 
3,000 soldiers, capable of executing amphibious operations. The force appears to be 
directed at Japan’s ongoing island territorial disputes with China, Russia, and South Korea. 
In essence, Japan now holds a force capable of retaking island holdings that have been 
temporarily seized by an adversary military, so the hope is that capability will deter an 
adversary from making a land-grab attempt. The second acquisition decision was the 
announcement that Japan’s two IZUMO-class Helicopter Destroyers would be refitted to 
carry, launch, and recover Japan’s newly acquired F-35B multi-role aircraft.57 Such a refit 
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transforms those vessels into small aircraft carriers in all-but-name and represents Japan’s 
first post-war maritime capability of projecting force against land-based targets. The Japan 
Ministry of Defense insists that these acquisitions are not a reorientation towards offensive 
capability, but rather offer increased versatility in responding to scenarios where Japanese 
territory has come under attack.58 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The trajectory of security policy developments over the period illustrate a trend 
towards increased military capability, both in legal and material terms. Over the period, 
Japan established and exercised conditions in which its forces could be deployed abroad, 
albeit in a nonviolent capacity. Constitutional reinterpretation has allowed for the creation 
of collective self-defense policy, expanding the scenarios in which Japanese Self Defense 
Forces could legally resort to the use of force in conflict. What’s more, the acquisition of 
new weapons and platforms, such as the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, F-35 Joint 
Strike fighters with standoff munitions, a small carrier to field them overseas, and a modest 
amphibious force designed for island assault, all indicate toward a coherent desire for 
expanded military capability. However, in spite of the aforementioned developments, two 
important metrics remain unchanged, and continue to limit Japan’s capacity for military 
power. Perhaps most prominently is the continued lack of official amendment to Japanese 
constitution Article 9, which prohibits the maintenance of “war potential,” currently 
interpreted to mean a standing military (Self Defense Force excepted) and strategic 
weapons.59 Second, the Japanese defense budget has not significantly increased from its 
1% of GDP starting point at the beginning of the period, thereby precluding all possibility 
for the general growth of Japan’s armed forces.60 The next Chapter will explore the factors 
that have driven Japan’s observed security policy trajectory. 
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III. FACTORS 
The timeline above establishes a past trajectory of security policy development 
towards increased military development, which begs the question of what factors have 
driven those observed outcomes. The examination of factors will begin with the IR Realism 
premise that external security threats drive state foreign policy decisions. Walt’s Balance 
of Threat Theory has been chosen as a suitable theoretical framework for exploring this 
premise, but this thesis does not take a position on the accuracy of the specific points within 
the theory.61 
In broad strokes, Walt’s theory argues that states respond to perceived external 
threat generated by other states, and that threat is generated through four factors: aggregate 
power, proximate power, offensive capability, and offensive intent.62 The state response 
to threat is typically balancing, either externally by seeking partners or internally by 
strengthening its unilateral ability to guarantee security. Alternatively, a state that is so 
overwhelmingly threatened as to make balancing unfeasible will attempt to bandwagon 
with the threatening state as a last resort. Balance of Threat Theory has been criticized for 
its lack of concrete measures that could be used to qualitatively evaluate the validity of the 
theory. Gause, for instance, points out that Walt does not offer a method for weighting the 
four identified potential threat factors, which limits the theory to a qualitative analysis role 
that relies on murkier arguments of human psychological perception and intention.63 As a 
result, the conclusions reached when applying Walt’s theory to real world cases must rely 
upon qualitative assessments made by the analyst as to the degree of perceived threat 
generated by each of the four threat factors. In the case of this paper’s analysis regarding 
the difference between Japan’s expected versus observed balancing actions, quantitative 
data is used in combination with Japanese diplomatic statements, official documents, and 
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observed balancing actions in order to make a qualitative assessment of the perceived 
external threat that Japanese policymakers experience. 
Japan’s security policy development trajectory, in the face of rising threats, appears 
to fit the theory’s anticipated policy direction: balancing. However, there is an observable 
difference between the degree of balancing anticipated by Balance of Threat Theory and 
the observed reality. Japan’s security policy development has not been sufficient to match 
the vast increase in perceived threat that has been generated by China and North Korea. 
The explanatory gap can be sufficiently filled through examination of Japan’s powerful 
internal political factors that ultimately modulate Japanese elite decisions and create the 
observed security policy outcomes. 
For the purposes of our analysis, the factors influencing Japanese security policy 
outcomes will be broadly divided into two categories: external and internal. However, it 
must be acknowledged that internal factors cannot be completely separated from external 
factors. After all, internal factors respond to and are shaped over time by external factor 
inputs. It remains worthwhile to separate them for the purposes of this discussion because 
the internal factors of a state, as they exist at any given moment, are shaped by forces in 
addition to the typical international structures of power and threat. In Japan’s case, those 
forces include antiwar norms, a broad distrust of domestic revisionist political agendas, 
political party stagnation, and the personal power and preferences of the sitting Prime 
Minister. Those internal factors then have the effect of modulating the observed state 
security policy outcome. External factor inputs are fed into the internal factor system and 
are interpreted by various internal factor elements in the process of forming state security 
policy change. The internal factors of the Japanese state possess a significant capability to 
modulate state security policy outcomes, but the observed long-term trajectory of Japanese 
security policy from 1989 to 2020 has primarily conformed, in direction if not degree, with 
that anticipated by external factor inputs. The individual elements of the various internal 
and external factors do not uniformly exert pressure in the same policy direction. 
Nevertheless, external factor inputs have, in aggregate, driven Japanese security policy 
towards increased militarization while internal factor inputs have, in aggregate, acted as a 
braking mechanism upon that policy change. 
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In the following sections of this chapter, this thesis will explore what has been 
identified to be the most significant external and internal factors. The external factors 
identified are China presence, North Korea presence, U.S. presence, and U.S. diplomacy. 
The internal factors identified are antimilitarist norms, single-party dominance, suspicion 
of revisionists, and prime minister preferences. 
A. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
1. China 
China’s presence has become a much stronger factor of Japan’s security policy 
considerations over the observed time period as a result of its dramatically increased 
manufacturing capacity, military modernization, and territorial ambitions. Each of these 
must be examined in accordance with Walt’s threat factors of aggregate power, proximate 
power, offensive capability, and offensive intent to gain a clear understanding of the extent 
to which China influenced the development of Japan’s security policy over the observed 
time period.64 
a. Aggregate Power 
Walt’s suggested sub-factors of aggregate power are population, industrial 
capability, military capability, and technological prowess.65 This paper will use World 
Bank data for the measures of population and industrial capability, which is limited to 2018 
as the most recent year’s measures. Population provides a broad measure of available 
manpower resources that can be directed to warfare and supporting roles during a conflict. 
By this measure, China has dwarfed Japan throughout all recorded history and certainly in 
our observed time period from 1989 to 2020. In 2000, China had a population of 1.263 
billion in comparison to Japan’s 126.8 million.66 By 2018, the most recent year of data 
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available to the World Bank, China’s population had increased to 1.393 billion while 
Japan’s had slightly decreased to 126.5 million. To put in perspective the tremendous 
disparity here, China’s population increased over the period by a greater number of people 
than Japan has in total. 
The most straightforward measure of industrial capability is GDP. While not the 
only measure available, it provides a broad approximation of the material resources that a 
state can direct towards warfare during a conflict. Unlike population, China and Japan 
experienced a dramatic change of relative position by this measure. In 2000, China’s 
dramatically larger population produced a comparatively low GDP (adjusted for 2020 
dollar values) of $1.21 trillion, while Japan held a GDP of $4.89 trillion.67 By 2010, the 
balance shifted as China’s GDP rose to $6.09 trillion against Japan’s $5.7 trillion. By 2018, 
China’s GDP had risen to a staggering $13.61 trillion, and Japan’s had fallen to $4.97 
trillion. 
Military Capability will be quantified in this section through the broad measure of 
military spending as an attempt to identify China and Japan’s differences in aggregate 
military power rather than specific capability differences, which will be explored later in 
the offensive capabilities section. By this measure, China’s military spending has 
dramatically expanded since 2000 and transitioned from a subordinate position relative to 
Japan into a dominant one.68 In 2000, China spent $43.1 billion (adjusted for 2018 dollars) 
in comparison to Japan’s $45.4 billion.69 By 2001, China’s military spending grew to $52 
billion, exceeding Japan’s $46.2 billion. By 2019, China’s military spending had grown to 
$266.4 billion in comparison to Japan’s nearly stagnant $46.6 billion. 
Technological prowess is a difficult factor to measure quantitatively, especially 
because a state’s technological prowess is often unevenly distributed across the various 
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public, private, and military sectors. For example, a state may be a world leader 
biotechnology while lacking any indigenous capability to manufacture missiles. The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development offers two possible methods to 
measure this data, with widely varying results. The first is by the number of active triadic 
patent families (patents filed in the three major world patent offices: U.S. Patent Office, 
European Patent Office, and Japan Patent Office). By this count, Japan remained far ahead 
of China throughout the entire period. In 2000, China held a score on this index of 87.01 
in comparison to Japan’s 18,264.03.70 By 2017 (the latest year of data), China had only 
just begun to close the gap with a value of 4,152.15 against Japan’s 18,219.25. As with the 
other measures, China shows signs of rapid growth while Japan remains stagnant, but here 
the gap is so broad that Japan remains dominant for the time being. China has pulled ahead, 
however, by measure of gross domestic spending on research and development. In 2000, 
China’s domestic expenditure measured $44.44 billion in comparison to Japan’s $133.30 
billion, but by 2008 China matched Japan’s yearly expenditure.71 By 2018 (last year of 
data), China’s domestic R&D expenditure grew to $526.06 billion in comparison to Japan’s 
relatively stagnant $173.28 billion. The wide discrepancy between the two measures is 
worthy of its own examination, but the CSIS China Power Team offers some potential 
insights. In terms of patents, China’s patent office receives and grants more domestic 
patents than any other country in the world, but many of those domestic patent claims are 
relatively low-value and do not often translate into submissions at other recognized 
international patent offices.72 CSIS goes on to argue that perhaps Chinese patents, and 
therefore Chinese R&D investment is being channeled toward relatively low-innovation 
developments. 
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b. Proximate Power 
In terms of proximate power, China stands less than five hundred miles of open sea 
away from mainland Japan. Accordingly, the proximate power of distance is significant. 
However, the proximate power generated by close proximity alone is tempered by the fact 
that the sea offers considerable protection from Chinese ground forces. Their use against 
Japan would necessitate either an amphibious landing or airborne operation, each with 
significant drawbacks. On the other hand, the sea does nothing to temper the proximate 
power generated by China’s numerous warships, aircraft, and missiles that can easily be 
brought within striking distance of the Japanese mainland. A more specific analysis of 
those threatening capabilities will be explored below, in the offensive capabilities section. 
c. Offensive Capability 
In terms of military power, China invested heavily in its offensive capabilities from 
2000 to 2020. However, strictly by number of personnel and platforms, the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) has shrunk from 2000 to 2019. For example, in 2000, the PLA 
numbered 2.4 million active-duty personnel, with 1.3 million People’s Armed Police (PAP) 
and 1.5 million reserve militia that China could mobilize in a conflict.73 As of 2019, China 
reduced that force to approximately 2 million active-duty and 500,000 PAP personnel.74 
Despite the manpower reduction, the overall combat effectiveness, and more importantly 
the offensive capability, of those forces has dramatically increased. China carried out its 
force modernization alongside a strategic shift that began in the early 1990s toward long-
range combat against high-end adversaries that are held outside of Chinese borders.75 
The PLA Rocket Force has maintained an offensive capability before and during 
our entire observed time period that presents an existential threat to Japan. It is true that 
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China maintained a no-first-use nuclear weapons policy throughout the period, but Japan 
could feasibly come under nuclear attack if the United States were to engage in a nuclear 
war with China. What has changed since 2000 is a dramatic expansion in the variety, 
quantity, and flexibility of ballistic missile systems. In 2000, China only had one type of 
road-mobile solid-fuel MRBM, the CSS-5. The rest of the Chinese ballistic missile 
inventory was liquid-fueled, and therefore less mobile and slower to fire.76 As of 2019, 
China maintains seven different types of road-mobile solid-fuel ballistic missiles that cover 
the full spectrum of range and payload.77 The increased survivability of these systems and 
a wider range of employment options provides China with a greater offensive capability in 
this realm in 2020 than they began with in 2000. 
The PLA Airforce (PLAA) has, as with China’s other service branches, undergone 
a reduction in manpower and platforms alongside an overall increase in offensive 
capability. In 2000, China maintained 1000 bombers that were all limited to unguided 
munitions.78  By 2019, the PLAA bomber force had been reduced to 450 aircraft. However, 
these are now all variants of the H-6 Badger platform, some of which are outfitted to fire 
air-launched CJ-20 cruise missiles (ALCM) and are capable of striking targets anywhere 
in Japan from standoff ranges.79 
The PLA has maintained a limited offensive capability that could be brought to bear 
against Japan throughout the observed time period. While it has maintained a large number 
of personnel (3.5 million active, reserve and PAP in 2000 compared to 1.5 million active 
and PAP in 2019), China’s modest amphibious capability limits the number of those troops 
that could be employed to threaten Japan.80 China’s amphibious ship force has only grown 
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from fifty to fifty-three ships in the time between 2000 and 2019, capable of delivering a 
single division ashore. To further mitigate PLAA’s threat to Japan, that limited amphibious 
force is double tasked to deliver PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) forces ashore. 
The PLANMC brings a ground force capability that can threaten Japanese island 
holdings but would be unlikely to present a serious threat to the Japanese mainland. It has 
significantly developed since 2000, when the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
assessed it to be “capable of performing only regional, battalion-size amphibious 
operations.”81 As of 2019, the PLANMC had a personnel strength of 28,000 – 35,000 and 
has trained for high-end combined-arms conflicts.82 Such a force dwarfs Japan’s 
equivalent force, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), which numbers 
less than 3,000 personnel.83 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has significantly increased the number of surface 
combatant vessels (from 60 in 2000 to 108 in 2020) while maintaining a nearly constant 
number of submarines (from 66 in 2000 to 62 in 2020).84 The most significant naval threat 
shift for Japan, however, comes from the increasing capability of Chinese naval combatants 
throughout the period. In 2000, most of the PLAN submarine fleet lacked anti-ship cruise 
missile (ASCM) capability, and the six that had it were only capable of firing relatively 
rudimentary C-802 missiles while surfaced. As of 2020, the majority of the Chinese 
submarine force is capable of firing advanced, long-range ASCMs (such as the Russian-
produced SS-N-27 and domestically produced YJ-18 while submerged). China’s naval 
strike capability against the Japanese mainland has also increased. China has held a 
conventional/nuclear ballistic missile capability since 1987, but that was limited to a single 
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XIA-class SSBN.85 By 2010 that capability expanded with the commissioning of the JIN-
class SSBN and eventually grew to four JIN-class SSBNs as of 2020.86 China has also 
developed more conventional naval strike capabilities through the purchase of the 
LIAONING Soviet-era aircraft carrier and the domestically-built SHANDONG aircraft 
carrier of the same design. China still lacks an operational naval-launched LACM 
capability, but such a capability is in development. 
d. Offensive Intentions 
China’s offensive intentions toward Japan have remained restrained but escalating 
throughout the observed time period. China has not made any indication of a desire to 
invade the Japanese mainland, which obviates Walt’s most dramatic potential indicator of 
aggression. However, there has been considerable development of aggression in Chinese 
behaviors towards contested airspace and the contested Senkaku Islands feature. Perhaps 
the most concerning trend for Japanese leaders has been the rise of Chinese state-sponsored 
anti-Japanese nationalism that began in 1985, picked up speed in the 1990s, and then 
became an active feature of Chinese foreign policy beginning in 2010.87 Since that time, 
high profile incidents between the two states have been exacerbated by widespread protest 
and outrage in China that the CCP no longer tamps down, either for political expediency 
or out of fear that angry nationalists could delegitimize state authority.88 The rise of anti-
Japanese nationalist rhetoric has coincided with the aforementioned increase in military 
provocations between China and Japan. For example, the number of times that China 
triggered Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) fighter aircraft scrambles has consistently 
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increased throughout the observed time period. The number of intercepts in a yearly period 
peaked in 2016 with 851, a count that has not been surpassed as of 2020. For comparison, 
in 2010, Chinese military aircraft triggered just 96 scrambles by the JASDF.89 In 2019, the 
number of yearly scrambles had increased to 675.90 Maritime territorial water incursions 
upon the contested Senkaku Islands have likewise dramatically increased, as will be 
discussed below. 
The sole contested territorial feature between China and Japan is the Senkaku 
Islands, and Chinese assertions of sovereignty over the feature has increased significantly 
over the period. From 1989–2011, Chinese territorial water (TTW) incursions into the 
Senkaku Islands were relatively rare, as sometimes entire years would pass without one.91 
However, beginning in September 2012 with Japan’s purchase of the islands from a 
Japanese citizen claiming ownership of the islands, China began an effort to routinely send 
Chinese Coast Guard vessels on TTW incursions as a challenge to Japanese sovereignty 
over the feature. These TTW incursions peaked at a rate of seventeen per month in the late 
2012–2013 period and then settled down to an average rate of ten incursions per month 
from 2014–2020.92 China has stopped short of sending military forces within the contested 
territorial waters, but it remains a fear of Japanese policymakers that China could one day 
attempt to seize the islands by force. This fear of offensive intentions has been a significant 
factor of Japan’s security policy development over the observed time period. 
2. North Korea 
North Korea looms large as a long-standing feature of Japanese foreign 
policymaking discussion. In Walt’s terms, North Korea generates consistent threat through 
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a combination of proximate power, certain offensive capabilities, and offensive intent. Its 
proximate power is made significant by the short 400 miles that separate it from Japan. Its 
offensive capabilities are manifested in a missile threat (both conventional and nuclear) 
and special operations activities that have a proven capability to penetrate Japanese 
territory. Those two sources of power are then shaped into perceived sources of threat by 
North Korea’s ambiguous but ever-present rhetoric that signals offensive intent towards 
Japan. Its offensive intent is made all the more menacing due to the opacity of North 
Korean leadership’s and the subsequent threat of an irrational actor coming to executive 
power. 
a. Aggregate Power 
Aggregate power is difficult to measure in North Korea’s case, because the various 
measures within the larger factor are so lopsided. By measure of population, industrial 
capacity, and general technological prowess, North Korea’s power is marginal. In 2019, 
North Korea had a population of 25.3 million and an estimated GDP of $31.9 billion, in 
comparison to Japan’s population of 126.3 million and GDP of $5.1 trillion, which means 
North Korea had a 2019 GDP that was 0.6% of Japan’s.93 North Korea does not possess 
any triadic patent families, which indicates a lack of participation in high-tech development 
and manufacturing. On the other hand, North Korea has significant, but narrow, military 
capability and technological prowess in terms of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons 
capability. Therefore, North Korea possesses a very narrow form of aggregate power that 
cannot compete with Japan’s robust aggregate power in a long-term conflict (either 
economic or military), but could inflict withering short-term costs upon Japan’s population 
and manufacturing base in an initial strike. By examining this situation through the lens of 
Balance of Threat Theory, this paper will argue that North Korea’s narrowly focused forms 
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of aggregate power generates a sustained high threat towards Japan when taken in 
combination with its proximate power, offensive capability, and offensive intent. 
b. Proximate Power 
In terms of proximate power, North Korea sits less than four hundred miles of open 
sea away from mainland Japan, at the closest point. However, North Korea only has the 
capability to project a limited range of destructive force across that sea.94 It lacks any 
credible amphibious capability to bring a conventional ground force to Japanese shores, so 
an all-out land invasion of Japan remains implausible. Likewise, the North Korean Airforce 
is limited by serious technological, material condition, and training, and resource 
limitations that preclude any significant threat capability against the Japanese mainland. 
The North Korean Navy, too, possesses no credible capability to threaten the Japanese 
mainland, despite sporadic efforts to operationalize North Korea’s lone GORAE class 
ballistic missile submarine.95 The two significant threat capabilities that North Korea can 
project onto the Japanese mainland are missile attacks and special forces units, either of 
which could be used to transport a nuclear weapon onto Japanese soil. The details of those 
capabilities will be explored below. 
c. Offensive Capability 
The North Korea rocket force and special forces units project a threat capability 
onto the Japanese mainland. These capabilities have been present over the entire observed 
period, as North Korea first demonstrated its ability to infiltrate and Japan in the 1970s and 
first demonstrated its ability to strike the Japanese mainland with missiles in 1990.96 North 
Korea used its infiltration capabilities to kidnap at least 17 Japanese citizens in the 1970s 
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and 1980s, demonstrating a capability that could be used to put special forces ashore for 
more destructive purposes.97 The threat potential of both aforementioned capabilities was 
greatly amplified by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. In 2006, the North 
executed its first successful nuclear weapons test, opening the door to the possibility of 
North Korean special operations forces bringing a nuclear weapon ashore to Japan. In 2016 
the nuclear threat was amplified when U.S. and South Korean officials announced that 
North Korea potentially achieved the capability to mount a nuclear warhead onto a ballistic 
missile.98 As of 2020, the South Korea Ministry of Defense estimates that North Korea 
possesses 10,000 ballistic missiles.99 Although it is estimated as of 2019 that North Korea 
possesses only 10–20 nuclear warheads (with enough fissile material to produce 60 total), 
it would be impossible for Japan’s ballistic missile defenses to identify the nuclear-tipped 
missiles within a larger salvo of conventional ballistic missiles targeting Japan.100 The 
development of that ballistic missile threat exerted considerable pressure on Japan over the 
observed time period to incorporate a ballistic missile defense role within its security 
policy. However, as Hughes discusses, Japan’s ballistic missile defenses can be just-as-
well applied towards defense against Chinese ballistic missile attacks. 
d. Offensive Intentions 
North Korea’s offensive intentions are difficult to read, if only because it has made 
frequent bellicose threats of imminent destruction against Japan, South Korea, and the 
United States for decades.101 Moreover, North Korea has previously demonstrated 
 
97 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea,” MOFA, 
accessed June 10, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction/index.html. 
98 Jack Kim, “North Korea Can Put Nuclear Warhead on Mid-Range Missile: South,” Reuters, April 
5, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-idUSKCN0X21EM. 
99 Kim Min-seok, “The State of the North Korean Military - Korea Net Assessment 2020: Politicized 
Security and Unchanging Strategic Realities,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 
October 2, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/18/state-of-north-korean-military-pub-81232. 
100 International Panel on Fissile Materials, “North Korea - Fissile Material,” International Panel on 
Fissile Materials, accessed December 1, 2020, http://fissilematerials.org/countries/north_korea.html. 
101 Jack Kim and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “North Korea Threatens to ‘sink’ Japan, Reduce U.S. to ‘Ashes 
and Darkness,’” Reuters, September 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-
idUSKCN1BP0F3. 
42 
material aggression against Japan through the aforementioned abduction programs of the 
1970s-1980s and the fly-over of a ballistic missile test in 1998 and 2017. Still, while North 
Korea’s broader threats of missile barrages and nuclear destruction have not come to pass 
during the observed period, Japanese policymakers have come to view North Korea as 
progressively more threatening over the period.102 Japanese policymakers and media have 
perceived North Korea’s demonstrations of capability to violate Japanese territory and 
airspace, along with a rising trend of verbal threats, as an indication of rising offensive 
intent.103  
The intensity of the threats, an increasing capability to make good on them, and the 
uncertainties of dealing with such a closed state are reason enough for Japanese leadership 
to invoke North Korea’s potential offensive intentions as a threat to Japan’s security.104 
The most dangerous concern is the possibility that a rapidly destabilizing North Korean 
regime could launch a catastrophic but ultimately irrational ballistic missile attack against 
the Japanese mainland, even if North Korea lacks the capability to meaningfully profit from 
the attack. North Korea’s ambiguous offensive intentions are a widely cited reason for 
Japanese security policy development.105 
3. The United States 
a. Security Force Presence 
The U.S. has maintained a continuous military presence within Japan that pre-dates 
the observed time period by 44 years. U.S. military presence has influenced Japanese 
security policy development in two important ways. First, the continuous presence of the 
only forward-deployed US-carrier and carrier air wing has reduced (but not eliminated) 
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Japan’s need for indigenous security force deterrent by simultaneously providing a force 
presence and symbolic indication of U.S. resolve to defend Japan’s territory. Second, Oros 
argues that U.S. forces’ more aggressive rules of engagement (relative to Japan) have 
helped to shape the JSDF to act as the “shield” in relation to the U.S. “sword.”106 U.S. 
military presence in Japan has not changed significantly over the observed time period. Of 
particular significance in this discussion is the US’ role in providing a nuclear umbrella for 
Japan. As a result of defense commitments that emerged following China’s achievement 
of nuclear weapons capability in 1964, the U.S. has maintained an extended nuclear 
deterrence guarantee that any nuclear weapons attack against Japan will be met with a 
response from the U.S. nuclear arsenal.107 This guarantee has provided Japan with an 
indirect nuclear deterrent that, so long as viewed to be credible, obviates the need for Japan 
to develop a unilateral nuclear weapons capability. The credibility of the US’ guarantee 
has been and continues to be the subject of ongoing discussion and debate, not least of 
which among Japanese scholars and policymakers.108 After all, the prospect that the U.S. 
would willingly enter an all-out mutually destructive nuclear war in the name of upholding 
its commitment of retribution for an attack against Japan is a situation that has not been put 
to the test. Nevertheless, the Japanese government consistently cited the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella as the foundation of its nuclear deterrence policy throughout the period.109 The 
long-term presence of the guarantee has been a sub-factor that provides external deterrent 
balancing power and thus reduces the pull towards militarization in Japanese security 
policy. 
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b. U.S. Diplomacy 
Beginning in the 1980s, U.S. diplomacy towards Japan increasingly pressured 
Japanese security policy towards increased burden-sharing within the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.110 As Smith notes, during the Cold War, U.S. diplomacy was focused on financial 
burden-sharing so that the U.S. could focus its resources elsewhere against the Soviet 
Union. However, the intensity of this factor increased during the observed time period and 
manifested as requests for force modernization, force growth, and force role developments. 
Smith discusses how, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001, the U.S. 
pressured Japan to take on a more significant global security role, both in the defense of 
Japan itself and as a participant in US-led coalitions efforts in the Middle East. While Japan 
had previously taken tentative steps toward such participation by deploying minesweepers 
in the Korean War and following the conclusion of Desert Storm, the U.S. regarded these 
efforts as too little, too late.111 The U.S. desired Japan to take on more significant roles 
where its personnel were sharing in the hardship and risk of other coalition forces. Since 
2001, the U.S. has repeatedly pressured Japan to increase its military capabilities, expand 
its contributions to regional security, and to engage in global efforts to  uphold international 
norms.112 However, Japan has remained wary of the US’ initiatives to compete and risk 
conflict with China, and there is significant concern among Japanese policymakers that 
Japan could be dragged into a costly Sino-US conflict that it does not want.113 The 
diplomatic factors of direct pressure from the U.S., fears of abandonment, and fears of 
entrapment all push in favor of further unilateral militarization to achieve the outcome of 
increased Japanese security. 
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B. INTERNAL FACTORS 
1. Antimilitarist Norms 
Japan features strong antimilitarist norms that emerged following the close of 
World War II and persist to this day. The impact of these norms upon contemporary Japan 
security policy outcomes is debated, but it is widely accepted that Japan’s antimilitarist 
norms emerged for two reasons. First, a recognition of the Imperial Japanese military’s role 
in drawing Japan into World War II and its disastrous outcome. Second, the overriding 
U.S. influence over the post-war Japanese constitution that was purposefully designed to 
reject the use of force to achieve political ends. Japanese media outlets, political elites, and 
protestors alike paid frequent deference to these norms as being centrally connected to the 
core of modern Japanese identity throughout the period. However, the progression of 
security policy development illustrates that these antimilitary norms were not capable of 
outright stopping security policy development throughout the period. In the face of the 
external pressures discussed previously, Japanese security policy did move towards 
increased capability and force projection. Nevertheless, norms stand out as a likely factor 
in explaining the gap between the vast increase in Japan’s external threats and the 
comparatively restrained balancing response. 
The domestic popularity of antimilitary norms over the period has remained 
remarkably stable.114 Miyashita explores the issue through extensive polling data analysis 
which shows that, despite fluctuations that occurred as a result of then-current perceived 
threats to security, the broader trend is that the domestic popularity of Japan’s antiwar 
norms have held, and in some cases strengthened, over the period. On top of domestic 
popularity, the staying power of Japan’s antiwar norms is reinforced by the fact that they 
are legally enshrined within the post-war Japanese constitution. The issue is dealt with most 
explicitly, but not exclusively, within Japan Constitution Article 9. Official discussion of 
security policy is always conducted in the context of Article 9’s specific verbiage, and so 
it bears quoting here: 
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1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.115  
As a result of Article 9 and similarly normative passages, antiwar norms are 
institutionally reinforced with each generation as Japanese students are taught about the 
guiding principles of their country. Antimilitary norms are strengthened at the elite level 
by the fact that many members of the conservative LDP are themselves adherents of 
antimilitary norms, thereby reinforcing the policy braking mechanism even when the LDP 
holds uncontested legislative power. Moreover, the constitution mandates a 2/3rds majority 
vote from a nation-wide referendum for any formal constitutional amendments, which has 
so far precluded even the most hawkish ruling elites from achieving a definite revision to 
Article 9. 
2. Suspicion of Revisionists 
Widespread public distrust towards the long-term ambitions of revisionist 
politicians has negatively colored public perception of their associated security policy 
development initiatives.116 Conservative revisionists are associated with an unpopular 
package of ideologies that aim to, in addition to strengthening the military, downplay the 
atrocities Japan committed during World War II, reduce individualism in society in favor 
of nationalist commitments, reject western cultural influences, embrace traditional 
Japanese values and religion, and take a more assertive position for Japan on the world 
stage. All of these positions are decidedly unpopular with Japanese voters, not to mention 
regional neighbors and trade partners, who fear that a strengthened military risks 
empowering the revisionists to seize control of Japanese society.117 Such control, it is 
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feared, could draw Japan into the same sort of devastating adventurism and conflicts that 
are remembered so acutely from World War II.  
This factor was especially pronounced during the 2012–2020 Abe administration, 
when Prime Minister Abe, well known for his revisionist and nationalist ideas, 
unsuccessfully pushed for a formal revision to constitution Article 9 throughout his time in 
office.118 Being a revisionist, his ideology contributed to resistance by a Japanese populace 
that regarded his motives with suspicion. As an illustration of this effect, consider that in 
2003, 54% of respondents to a Yomiuri Shimbun poll supported revising the 
constitution.119 By early 2020, only 27% of respondents to an Asahi Shimbun poll 
supported a revision to Article 9.120 Therefore, Abe’s second tenure as Prime Minister 
from 2012–2020 correlates with the decline in popular support. Abe was able to enact a 
legislative reinterpretation of Article 9, which sidestepped the popular vote and drew heavy 
protests throughout Japan but was ultimately prevented from accomplishing his goal of a 
formal revision. As such, the predominant attitude of suspicion towards revisionists was 
sufficient over the observed period to prevent a successful constitutional revision. It 
remains to be seen whether a more liberal-minded political elite would find a broader 
reception to security policy development and constitutional revision without triggering 
voter fears that are anchored on antimilitarist norms. 
3. Single-Party Dominance 
Japan’s current ruling party, the LDP, has ruled Japan nearly continuously for all 
but five years since 1955. The LDP has achieved its marked longevity by engaging in 
extensive compensation politics with vast swaths of the Japanese economy, integrating 
itself into permanent relationships with a state economic bureaucracies and businesses, and 
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remaining ideologically flexible in the face of changing public opinion.121 As a result, the 
LDP is an ideologically diluted organization which is generally not beholden to specific 
party policy lines.122 The resulting electoral structure places the LDP so securely in power 
that its party elites are given significant latitude to pursue gradual security policy initiatives 
so long as they do not cross the normative thresholds that could trigger an electoral 
backlash against the regime. Barring such a backlash, parliamentary elections over the 
observed period were decided primarily on domestic issues and platforms. Even the two 
power transition elections of 1993 and 2009 were decided on primarily domestic platforms. 
As such, this factor removes some of the policy-influencing teeth that norms would 
otherwise carry, and pushed, to a limited degree, in favor of increased security policy 
development over the observed period.  
The significance of Japan’s single-party dominance is increased further due to the 
fact that the LDP has internally drifted more towards hawkishness and revisionism 
beginning in the early 2000s and then accelerating under Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister. 
Samuels discusses how the LDP’s pragmatists were gradually forced out by the 
revisionists, who carried with them a more hawkish security policy agenda.123 Shibuichi 
observes that there has been a significant growth in Diet legislator membership in the far-
right political organization Nippon Kaigi since its foundation. Between 1997 and 2015, 
Diet legislator membership in the group expanded from 204 to 289.124 The modest increase 
in members appears to reflect a shift towards right-wing LDP membership, but Shibuichi 
cautions that many legislative members report to have joined purely out of a desire to 
support Abe and be looked upon favorably by his administration, rather than possesing a 
strong ideological affinity to the organization.  
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4. Prime Minister Preferences 
As a result of Japan’s tendency toward single-party dominance, the individual 
preferences of Prime Ministers have the potential to be especially significant for security 
policymaking outcomes. Prime Ministers who successfully consolidate power around 
themselves can obtain wide latitude for shaping foreign policy. So long as they avoid 
crossing the threshold necessary to spark meaningful voter outrage that could threaten the 
elected party majority, the only effective opposition is from their elected peers within the 
LDP. This factor works upon the same mechanism as the previous factor, suspicion of 
revisionists, but it weakens the other’s effect and has the possibility of pulling in the 
opposite direction. As the foremost example of this, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stood out 
with his preference to see Japan return to the world stage as a significant power.125 His 
efforts to achieve those ends have contributed to shifts in Japanese security policy 
development toward the development of lethal force projection capabilities (if not intent) 
beyond Japan’s local waters. However, the previously discussed popular suspicion of 
revisionist politics, in combination with a longstanding popular preference against 
alteration of Article 9, prevented Abe’s policy initiative from coming to fruition. During 
Abe’s resignation announcement in 2020, he expressed regret for failing to achieve his goal 
of Article 9 revision, underlining both the personal importance and yet inaccessibility of 
the issue.126  
The strength and policymaking vector of this factor depends upon the Prime 
Minister in power. Abe’s second tenure stood out for its longevity and therefore its ability 
to take advantage of this factor. This was in stark contrast to almost all of the other Japanese 
Prime Ministers during the observed period. Of the others, Junichiro Koizumi was the only 
other Prime Minister within the period to hold office for more than two years, which 
occurred from 2001–2005. Not coincidentally, Koizumi led significant efforts to expand 
the responsibilities and capabilities of the JSDF. As discussed in the trajectory chapter, he 
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obtained the legislative authority to deploy the JMSDF on long-term international resupply 
operations and deployed the JGSDF to Iraq, all in support of the U.S. coalition efforts in 
the Middle East. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The highlighted developments to Japanese security policy illustrate the highly 
correlative, if not definitively causational, relationship that external and internal factors 
have upon Japan’s security policy outcomes. External factors such as the U.S. presence, 
U.S. diplomacy, Chinese threat, and North Korean threat have expanded the bounds of 
feasible policy responses throughout the observed time period by, in aggregate, increasing 
perceived security threat against Japan. Internal factors such as antiwar norms, political 
stagnation, suspicion of revisionists, and prime minister preferences then exerted force 
within those externally established bounds to create the observed security policy outcomes. 
Individual elements of the external and internal factors do not uniformly push for or against 
Japanese security policy development. However, it is still fair to say that the observed 
preponderance of external factors pushed toward security policy development while the 
preponderance of internal factors acted as a brake against it. Therefore, the explanation 
appears to fit the observed trajectory over the period. Security policy development trended 
toward militarization, but at a rate that was not commensurate to the overridingly large 
increase in threat. The preponderant influence of internal factors appears to explain the 
subdued policy outcome that diverged from the preponderance of external factors being 
viewed within the framework of Walt’s Balance of Threat Theory.  
It must be caveated that, while aggregated total effect of internal factors did act as 
a brake upon the predominate militarization trajectory over the period, the individual 
internal factors that push in support of further militarization are powerful in their own right. 
Under the right conditions, the aggregate balance of policy directional “push” could be 
tipped in the other direction, so that internal factors end up, in aggregate, pushing toward 
militarization rather than against it. As noted in the foregoing paragraphs, the internal factor 
of single party dominance by the LDP, combined with the LDP’s ideological drift towards 
hawkish policy, pushes towards security policy development. Prime ministerial 
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preferences have the potential to push for or against security policy development, 
depending upon the preferences and powers of a given prime minister. Importantly, the 
“suspicion of revisionists” factor only pushes against security policy development so long 
as security policy development is seen as connected to revisionist agendas. If non-
revisionists establish a platform of security policy development for non-revisionist reasons, 
suspicion of revisionists could lose its teeth in resisting further security policy 
development. All of which is to say that the fact that internal factors, as a category, have 
slowed militarization is a situational outcome that could very well shift to support 
militarization if a non-revisionist Prime Minister consolidated power and pushed strongly 
in that direction. These possibilities will be explored in the next chapter, as this thesis 
discusses future factor durability. 
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IV. FACTOR DURABILITY 
In the preceding chapters, this thesis established an observed trajectory of Japan’s 
security policy development and argued in favor of the significant factors that drove that 
trajectory. External factors have predominately, although not exclusively, driven Japan’s 
security policy development toward internal and external balancing. However, the degree 
of balancing responses has been significantly smaller than the degree of external threat 
growth being generated by China, North Korea, and Russia over the period. The 
explanatory gap in degree of security policy response is plausibly filled by examining 
internal factors, which appear to have a powerful effect on modulating Japanese security 
policy outcomes. Those internal factors predominately, but not exclusively, push against 
internal and external balancing efforts. The resulting trajectory appears to be that Japan’s 
security policy development has been slowed, but not stopped, by internal factors. 
This chapter will assess the possible future endurance of the operating factors that 
decided on the security policy outcomes over the observed period, and attempt to look 
forward into plausible trajectories for future security policy development within Japan. 
First, it must be caveated that a future trajectory assessment is contingent upon the 
possibility that current trends hold. Attempting to make precise assessment of future 
policies is a fool’s errand because an unforeseeable change to one of the underlying factors, 
or the introduction of a new one, will necessarily have a dramatic effect upon the future 
trajectory. As a particularly poignant example, no one on September 10, 2001, would have 
assessed the U.S. as being likely to invade Afghanistan one month later. Instead, this thesis 
seeks to make an accurate assessment of probable broad policy trajectory direction based 
upon the factors observed. Such an assessed trajectory has value, even if significant 
variables change, fall out, or are newly introduced, because the remaining factors of more 
stalwart character will continue to exert systemic influence upon the newly altered 
trajectory. 
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A. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
External threat factors are likely to endure, at a minimum, and likely increase. By 
measure of aggregate power, China’s tremendous economic growth has slowed over the 
period but remains exceptionally strong in comparison to Japan and the United States. To 
put the growth disparity in perspective, China has averaged 9.2% year-on-year GDP 
growth over the entire period, and in 2019 featured 6.1% GDP growth.127 In comparison, 
Japan has averaged 1.2% over the period and finished 2019 with a meager 0.65% GDP 
growth. The U.S. fared better, averaging 2.5% over the period and finishing 2019 with 
2.3%, but still did not come close to China’s growth rate. A significant part of the trend 
can be explained as the continuing benefits of a developmental economy that will 
eventually run out, but for now the greater-than thirty years of consistent data suggest that 
the trend is likely to continue into the next decade at the very least. The picture looks even 
more dire when factoring in the still-developing 2020 data, in which the tumultuous 
economic effects of the coronavirus pandemic have ravaged most of the world’s economies 
but left China on an apparent trajectory to meet or exceed their 2019 GDP growth 
percentage. For comparison, the Q3 2020 GDP growth numbers are: 4.9% China, 1.3% 
Japan, and 1.8% U.S. compared to GDP in the same quarter last year. 
The future trajectory of military power disparity appears to likewise favor a 
continued rising threat of offensive capability towards Japan. From 2000–2020, China’s 
total military budget rose at an average growth rate of 10.2%, only slightly outpacing the 
country’s GDP growth rate over the same period (9.1%).128 The Chinese announcement 
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for official military budget growth in 2020 shrank to 6.6%, which appears to be a reflection 
of the corresponding reduction of economic growth due to the pandemic. Japan’s military 
spending similarly tracks with its economic growth based upon the informal principle of 
spending approximately 1% of GDP on defense, and so the combined 31-year trend of 
increasing disparity of military spending appears likely to continue.129 By proxy, China’s 
relative capability for generating threat based on offensive capability is also likely to 
continue until the underlying factors change. 
The future development of perceived Chinese offensive intent towards Japan is less 
clear. By measure of assertiveness over the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China could 
be seen as continuing to increase tensions. On November 2nd, 2020, Chinese Coast Guard 
vessels entered the islands’ contiguous zone for the 283rd (not consecutive) day this year, 
setting a new record for number of annual visits with two months left to push that number 
higher.130 However, territorial water incursions of those same islands are actually slightly 
down in 2020, with 8.25 incursions per month compared to an average of 10.5 incursions 
per month in 2019 and well below the high-water mark of 17.38 incursions per month 
during the height of the Senkaku Islands crisis from September 2012 to September 2013.131 
On the other hand, China is diplomatically positioning itself for a positive relationship with 
Japan’s Suga administration. On September 25th, Japanese Prime Minister Suga held a 
teleconference with Xi Jinping to establish first-contact between the leaders of the two 
states. During the conversation, Xi said that China hopes for a “cooperative partnership” 
with Japan, signifying a continuing usage of the term since it was first established in 
2018.132 The partnership attitude focuses on continued recognition of the “Four Basic 
Documents” that underpin modern Sino-Japanese relations, as well as mutual interests on 
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free trade and regional stability.133 Narratives of the rest of the teleconference content 
differ between Japanese and Chinese reporting, but for our purposes it is sufficient to say 
that China is opening the new chapter of Sino-Japanese relations by exploring options for 
cooperation without escalating contention.  
North Korea’s outlook for future level of threat to Japan continues to trend higher 
as a result of its continued pursuit of increasingly capable nuclear offensive capabilities, 
enduring offensive rhetoric, and the long-standing specter of future regime instability. 
Measures of aggregate power, meanwhile, are stagnant. The balance of aggregate power 
continues to overwhelmingly favor Japan because the size of North Korea’s economy 
remains dwarfed by Japan’s.134 As strict US-led international economic sanctions against 
North Korea continue, there is no reason at this time to expect a significant change to this 
factor in the near term. North Korean offensive intent remains a high threat factor due to 
aggressive rhetoric and fears of regime instability that are compounded by Japan’s 
proximity to the potentially unstable nuclear-armed state. North Korea’s long-standing 
drumbeat of hostile rhetoric towards Japan, interspersed with occasional direct threats of 
nuclear attack, has created a sustained tone of hostility and is suggestive of offensive intent. 
However, such threats are a familiar feature of Japan-North Korea relations, with little 
action to match the intense rhetoric. North Korea has not made significant commentary 
recently to indicate an escalation of their underlying foreign policy, which since 2019 has 
been confined to typical insults and vague threats.135  
Japan’s enduring perception of offensive intent threat is amplified by the North 
Korean regime’s opacity to external observation and apparent near-total concentration of 
power around Kim Jong-un.136 The combination of the two raises the constant specter of 
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sudden regime irrationality or instability that could result in the use of a nuclear weapon 
against Japan. As a result, the future threat impacts of North Korea’s offensive intent 
appear likely to endure so long as the current regime of North Korea remains in power. The 
one area where North Korea’s trajectory of threat growth towards Japan is clearly 
observable is offensive capability. North Korea has so far abided by a 2018 moratorium on 
nuclear weapons tests and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches while 
negotiations with the U.S. were ongoing, but in January 2020 Kim Jong-un announced that 
North Korea would no longer consider itself bound by the terms of the moratorium.137 
Most directly as a threat to Japan, North Korea continues to increase the quantity and 
quality of its nuclear weapons delivery systems. The latest, most direct indicator of this 
factor’s continued growth trajectory is the unveiling of North Korea’s new Hwasong-16 
ICBM, a much larger missile than its predecessors, which has been speculated by South 
Korean intelligence agencies and international analysts as being possibly designed to 
accommodate multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV).138 Whether 
this particular missile platform accommodates that development or not, the technological 
development path for nuclear weapons is clear and North Korea has given no indication 
that it is likely to cease its progression along it. As the number and capability of viable 
launch platforms and warheads increases, it strengthens the credibility of its capability to 
overwhelm Japan’s ballistic missile defenses in an all-out strike.139 
U.S. security force presence durability appears likely to endure as a significant 
factor for the foreseeable future. A recent point of evidence in favor of this assessment is 
that, despite contentious demands made by President Trump in 2019 for Japan to quadruple 
its payments to the U.S. in exchange for force presence, the Trump administration was 
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unwilling to directly propose force withdrawal as a bargaining chip.140 Speculation exists 
from Trump’s former National Security Advisor, John Bolton, that Trump privately desired 
a force withdrawal from Japan, in addition to his more open desires to withdraw from Korea 
and Europe.141 Nevertheless, the fact that even President Trump, as bombastic and 
ideologically skeptical of U.S. alliances as he was, was unwilling to raise the specter of 
force withdrawal from Japan is indicative of the entrenched U.S. interests that keep such a 
move off the bargaining table. Now that the U.S. has concluded its 2020 presidential 
election with a victory for Joe Biden, a stated alliance builder and globalist, there is good 
reason to believe that the offer of status quo of U.S. force presence in Japan is very likely 
to endure for at least the next four years. Within Japan’s own government, the newly 
appointed Prime Minister Suga has reaffirmed his predecessor’s commitment to the U.S.-
Japan alliance, and no significant national political parties are currently challenging that 
position. However, the caveat that must be made that commitments to U.S. force presence 
in Japan are especially vulnerable to dramatic shifts in executive leadership policy from 
either the U.S. or Japan. So, while acknowledging the potential for future factor instability 
beyond the next administration, it can be concluded that all observed factors of the present 
point towards an enduring U.S. presence that will continue to reduce Japan’s need to 
internally balance.  
U.S. diplomacy towards Japan has been less stable than force presence in recent 
years, as the aforementioned U.S. complaints of insufficient financial burden sharing from 
Japan stoked the ever-present fears of abandonment among Japanese policymakers. Those 
fears were at least partially assuaged by public conversations between Trump and Abe in 
2017, when Trump provided assurances that the U.S. remained fully committed to the 
security alliance and that concerns over finances were not indicative of broader wavering 
 
140 Sam Nussey, “Trump Asks Japan to Hike Payments for U.S. Troops to $8 Billion: Foreign 
Policy,” Reuters, November 16, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-usa-idUSKBN1XQ06F. 
141 Japan Times, “Higher Risk of U.S. Withdrawal from Japan If Trump Re-Elected: John Bolton,” 
The Japan Times, July 22, 2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/22/national/politics-
diplomacy/higher-risk-u-s-withdrawal-japan-trump-re-elected-john-bolton/. 
59 
to U.S. commitment.142 However such concerns increase the long-term intensity and 
credibility of voices within the Japanese government that fear abandonment. After all, even 
if this particular U.S. president was not willing to go so far as publicly state a desire to 
withdraw from the region, a successive U.S. populist President could. In the near-term, the 
new Biden administration appears to intend on assuaging these fears, as the President-elect 
was reportedly quick to assure Suga that “he looks forward to strengthening the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and working together on achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific.”143 The 
intentions of current U.S. presidential administrations are also only the most recent 
contributors to long-standing discussions in Japanese policy regarding the potential 
liabilities within the U.S.-Japan alliance. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are concerns that, 
as the regional stakes become higher for the U.S. due to China’s rise and North Korea’s 
nuclearization, the risks increase that Japan could be entrapped or abandoned by U.S. 
decisions informed by U.S. interests. The only way that Japan can alleviate such fears is 
through the development of increased unilateral deterrent capabilities. As a result, the 
degree to which this factor will influence future security policy is highly variable based on 
situation and personalities, but the vector of its security policy influence will remain 
pointed toward increased militarization. 
B. INTERNAL FACTORS 
Japan’s antiwar norms are a stable factor in the general sense of their persistence 
over time, but Miyashita demonstrated through opinion polls that the Japanese public’s 
commitment to them was measurably influenced by the security threats facing Japan at the 
time.144 Such an observation aligns with this paper’s hypothesis that, while internal factors 
like antiwar norms have considerable room to shift, it is the external factor realities that set 
the bounds of feasibility. In this case, the antiwar norms appear to be an ideal that the 
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Japanese public will accept a significant, if finite, amount of security risk to achieve, but 
will progressively reduce commitment to those norms as threat increases. The external 
threat factors are likely to continue increasing, will likely weaken the public’s (and 
subsequently the policymakers’) commitment to antiwar norms. Therefore, this paper 
concludes that antiwar norms will likely remain as a strong-but-diminishing internal factor 
that will resist further militarization in Japanese security policy development. 
Internal distrust of revisionists is subject to dynamic political change and 
preferences, but the policy-influencing potential of this factor is only as strong as the 
perceived connection between prospective security policy developments and the revisionist 
ideology. For example, if Suga, who is not known to be an ideological revisionist, were to 
gain traction and introduce security policy developments of his own design, he may find 
less resistance from the political bodies that so fiercely resisted Abe’s security policy 
developments due to suspicion of his revisionist motives. It may be the case that a more 
ideologically-neutral figure like Suga is able to win support for his policies on the basis of 
pragmatism, but that remains speculative. It is safe to say that distrust of revisionists can 
be expected to continue its current vector as a factor that resists militarization, but the 
degree to which this factor affects policy outcomes is highly dependent upon the revisionist 
ideal (or lack thereof) of Japanese executives and legislators. 
The future effects of the prime minister preferences factor are in flux at the time of 
this writing. Yoshihide Suga succeeded Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister of Japan on 
September 14, 2020. The ensuing policy direction, effectiveness, and longevity of his rule 
remain to be seen. Nevertheless, some preliminary assessments can be made based upon 
Suga’s background. In terms of policy preferences, Suga has built his career as a member 
of the conservative LDP, but has never shown a proclivity for nationalist ideals.145 Suga 
has made his career as a conservative pragmatist, more concerned with policy effects upon 
the lives of ordinary Japanese citizens than achieving dramatic goals of a particular 
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ideology.146 He is also the first LDP leader who is not a member of one of the LDP’s 
internal factions, which further removes him from the ideologically-driven background of 
his predecessor. On the other hand, he is anything-but a political outsider. Suga first 
achieved elected office in 1987 as a member of the Yokohama City Council, became a Diet 
member in 1996, developed a close relationship with Shinzo Abe soon after, and has been 
serving as Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary since 2012. He was viewed by many as Abe’s 
right-hand-man throughout Abe’s tenure as Prime Minister.147 Not surprisingly, he has 
broadly pledged to carry on Abe’s policy goals in areas of economics, security, and 
constitutional revision. The prospective longevity of Suga’s leadership has been called into 
question by many Japanese political commentators who believe that Suga was chosen as 
the safest continuity candidate to hold the course as an interim government in the lead-up 
to the scheduled 2021 general elections.148 The final months of 2020 and the lead-up to 
the 2021 election will be crucial, then, for observing and assessing whether Suga has the 
will and capacity to meaningfully influence Japan’s security policy trajectory. Without 
knowing who the Prime Minister will be after 2021, or their accompanying policy 
positions, this factor’s vector and degree are currently assessed as unknown. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis draws four primary conclusions. First, that Japan has maintained a 
consistent, but limited, security policy trajectory towards militarization over the observed 
period from 1989–2020. Second, that the observed trajectory is being driven by an 
interaction between external factors (China threat, North Korea threat, U.S. force presence, 
and U.S. diplomacy) and internal factors (antiwar norms, suspicion of revisionists, single-
party dominance, and prime minister preferences). Third, that the factors driving Japan’s 
security policy trajectory towards militarization are currently durable in both vector and 
degree, while the factors resisting further militarization are situationally malleable. Fourth, 
and finally, that Japan is likely to remain on a long-term trajectory towards further 
militarization, in which Japanese technological and legal capability for use of force will 
continue to expand. 
Over the observed period, Japan maintained a consistent trajectory towards limited 
increased military capability, both in legal and material terms. However, the rate and 
degree of change was disproportionate to the sharply rising level of threat generated by 
China and North Korea. Japan established and exercised new conditions in which its forces 
could be deployed abroad, albeit in a still-nonviolent capacity. Constitutional 
reinterpretation allowed for the creation of the collective self-defense policy, expanding 
the scenarios in which Japanese Self Defense Force could use lethal force to defend an ally 
in conflict.149 In the material realm, the acquisition of new weapons and platforms, such 
as the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, F-35 Joint Strike fighters with standoff 
munitions, a small carrier to launch fighters overseas, and a modest amphibious force 
designed for island assault, all indicate toward a coherent desire for expanded military 
capability.150 However, in spite of the aforementioned developments, two important 
metrics remain unchanged, and continue to limit Japan’s capacity for military power. 
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Perhaps most prominently is the continued lack of official amendment to Japanese 
constitution Article 9, which prohibits the maintenance of “war potential,” currently 
interpreted to mean a standing military (Self Defense Force excepted) and strategic 
weapons.151 Second, the Japanese defense budget has not significantly increased from its 
1% of GDP starting point at the beginning of the period, thereby precluding the general 
growth of Japan’s armed forces.152 
The rising threat generated by external factors drove the trajectory vector of 
Japanese security policy over the period, while internal factors modulated the rate and 
degree of change. Of the external factors, threat generated by China and North Korea were 
the primary deciders of the trajectory’s vector, in accordance with Walt’s Balance of Threat 
Theory, while U.S. diplomacy was a secondary contributor and U.S. force presence 
reduced the balancing pressure of the other three threat factors.153 At the same time, this 
paper also observed that there is a gap between the significant rise of external threats 
imposed upon Japan and the observed degree of balancing actions that Japan has taken to 
address those threats. The presence of certain powerful internal factors, namely antiwar 
norms and domestic suspicion of revisionists, appear to be sufficient to explain the 
observed gap in balancing behavior. However, internal factors did not uniformly resist the 
rate of policy change towards militarization. Factors such as single-party dominance and 
prime minister preferences sometimes supported the militarization trajectory over the 
observed period.  
A qualitative assessment was made of the durability of the significant external and 
internal factors, to inform the level of confidence in extrapolating the observed past 
trajectory of security policy development out into the future. Broadly speaking, the 
significant factors that push Japanese policy towards further balancing and militarization 
are highly durable in both vector and degree of policy influence. The significant factors 
that resist further balancing and militarization are less durable in vector and/or degree. The 
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two strongest internal factors that have slowed the rate and degree of militarization in the 
past are situationally malleable. First, the Japanese public’s commitment to antiwar norms 
responds to increased external threat with decreased commitment to those norms.154 If 
China and North Korea continue to grow increasingly threatening, it is assessed that a 
corresponding decrease in Japanese commitment to antiwar norms will probably be 
observed. Second, domestic suspicion of revisionists has only acted as a powerful braking 
mechanism against militarization because domestically unpopular revisionist ideology has 
historically been tied to militarization efforts. If a pro-militarization leader without the 
political baggage of a revisionist ideology, such as Suga, were to emerge and consolidate 
power, then opposition to militarization security policy development may be reduced. 
With the above factors and their assessed durability in mind, this paper assesses 
that Japan’s security policy is likely to remain on a restrained-rate trajectory towards 
further militarization so long as the underlying factors hold. Moreover, future volatility 
amongst the arrayed factors is most likely to further increase the rate, and possibly the 
degree, of militarization. If this assessment is correct, Japanese legal and material 
capability for use of force can be anticipated to expand for the foreseeable future. 
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